How It Will End
From the very beginning of the war in Ukraine it was inevitable that the Russian army, with its superiority in manpower and equipment, would be able to seize control of parts, if not the entirety, of Ukraine. It was also inevitable that the Russian army would not be able to retain the territories it would seize. The only question was how long it would take for these events to play out. Although the answer to that question still remains unknown, recent events seem to indicate that it may be sooner rather than later. As I have previously written, this saga will be without a happy ending for all involved parties.
Vladimir Putin started the war with overwhelming military advantage and an excess of confidence. He had concluded that the Ukrainians would panic when confronted by a massive display of military force and that the NATO nations would not be able come together to assist Ukraine. Both of these conclusions proved wrong. The Ukrainians, having lived under the rule of both the Soviet Union and Russia, were determined not to repeat those periods of their history. Perhaps even more importantly, the Biden administration had been able to re-unite the NATO nations after Putin, with the assistance of the Trump administration, had sought to tear them apart.
It was the former false conclusion that proved pivotal in the early weeks of the war. The Russian forces had not been prepared to face resistance by the Ukrainians. They were also hampered by confusion and logistical problems of their own making. The success of the Ukrainian army in repelling Russia’s invasion during the early weeks of the war not only caused the Russians to incur unexpected losses of men and equipment, but also gave the NATO nations confidence that assisting the Ukrainians would not be a fruitless endeavor. Even though the Russian forces regrouped and scaled back their initial objectives, those measures were largely offset by an influx of additional arms and support supplied by the NATO nations. As a result, even the Russians’ limited objectives of taking control of Ukraine’s eastern and southern provinces proved to be both slow and costly.
Recognizing the weaknesses in the skills and training of his military forces, Putin turned to his preferred strategy (intimidation) and his military advantage (fire power). He subjected Ukrainian cities and towns to constant bombardment which in many cases were totally reduced to rubble. After six months of fighting in a war they didn’t understand, the morale of the Russian troops (which was never high) fell to a new low as did their supplies of munitions. This set the stage for a counter offensive by the Ukrainians who during the month of September recaptured approximately 4,000 square miles of their countryside including a number of cities and towns. In their panic to retreat, the Russians left behind a number of tanks and military vehicles as well as stores of munitions.
As I previously reported in “Double or Nothing,”Putin sought to reverse the deteriorating situation faced by his army by calling up additional 300,000 troops. In an effort to solidify the gains his army had achieved, he held contrived referendums and declared Russia’s annexation of four Ukrainian provinces. Finally, for the second time since the beginning of the year, he threatened to use weapons of mass destruction if any Russian territory were attacked. Just in case the Ukrainians and their western allies might not be inclined to heed this threat Putin went on to proclaim, “This is not a bluff.”
Shortly thereafter a section of the recently constructed 12-mile bridge (the “Kerch Bridge) connecting Russia and Crimea was damaged by a truck bomb. Putin immediately declared that this was an “act of terrorism” perpetrated by the Ukrainians. Although the bridge bombing was celebrated by the Ukrainians, they did not acknowledge responsibility for it. It should be appreciated that there was no reason for the Ukrainians not to acknowledge responsibility for their actions since the bridge was being used by the Russians to resupply their forces in Crimea and southern Ukraine making it a legitimate military target.
Notwithstanding the Ukrainians’ failure to claim responsibility for the attack on the bridge, Putin proceeded to subject 40 Ukrainian cities (including Kyiv) to a series of missile attacks. These reprisal attacks were focused on water and electrical systems as well as residential buildings and were clearly designed to terrorize the civilian populations of the targeted cities. In addition, the destruction of electrical and water systems would make the affected municipalities almost unlivable, especially as winter approached.
According to U.S. intelligence sources, the Russian attacks on the Ukrainian cities had been planned days before the explosion on the bridge indicating that, at best, Putin was only seizing upon the explosion as a pretext for these missile attack. At least one military commentator has postulated that the explosion on the bridge was actually perpetrated by the Russians. He based his assertion on the location and timing of the explosion as well as the type of explosive that was used. In particular he pointed out that the bomb did not close off all traffic on the bridge and did not affect the bridge’s underlying structure which would have taken weeks to repair.
It is also seems suspicious that the Russian were able to identify and arrest eight alleged perpetrators within a few days. Even so, the idea that this was a “false flag” Russian operation seems strange as the Russians have attacked countless civilian targets throughout Ukraine without having felt the need to justify their actions. This apparent inconsistency may be explained by the fact that placing the blame for the bridge attack on the Ukrainians was not intended to influence world opinion, but rather to mobilize waning support for the war among Russian citizens.
Putin rose to political power via the KGB, an intelligence agency in charge of foreign intelligence and domestic counterintelligence. He never served in the Russian army. As a result, he has only limited familiarity with military strategy and tactics, a weakness that he has amplified by dismissing those military leaders who disagree with him and having little confidence in those who continue to advise him. One important military lesson that seems to have escaped him is that bombing civilians and their homes (as well as brutal tactics) tends to enhance, rather than diminish, a nation’s willingness to resist.
Aside from setbacks on the battlefield, Putin is beginning to encounter growing problems at home. Over 250,000 young Russian men have fled their country to avoid being drafted to serve in the war in Ukraine, an exodus undoubtedly prompted by the Russian army’s well-document disregard for the lives of its soldiers. It lost 8.6 million of its soldiers in World War II which is more than twice the number of combatants lost by Germany and almost 30 times the number of U.S. fatalities. The large number of Russians who have fled their country since Putin announced his “partial mobilization” is also a strong measure of the growing unpopularity of the war among the Russian people.
In addition, Putin is facing revolts from a number of former Soviet Union countries allied with Russia as well as resistance from some of the provincial leaders within the Russian Federation who believe their citizens, rather than those living in Russia’s population centers, are being unfairly targeted by the draft. On top of these problems, Putin’s most important allies, like Xi Jinping of China and Narendra Modi of India, have counseled him that continuing to pursue the war is “a bad idea.”
Putin is now beginning to run out of military options.The Russian army is reported to have lost over 1,300 tanks including so many of its advanced T-90 main battle tanks that it is reportedly now seeking to bring out of mothballs approximately 1,000 of 1960 vintage T-62 tanks. Russia’s equipment losses are also reported to include over 7,000 vehicles and other forms of heavy weaponry — like artillery pieces and missile systems. So much of that equipment has been captured by the Ukrainian army that Russia is now being credited as being Ukraine’s major supplier of heavy weapons.
Perhaps more importantly, Putin’s remaining troops are exhausted and their ammunition supplies are at a dangerously low level. This means that their ability to hold out much longer against Ukrainian counter-attacks is becoming doubtful. This may also explain why Putin is now pursuing a program of aerial bombardment. Even that tactic may be short-lived as it has been reported that many of the missiles the Russians are now using to attack Ukraine cities are actually designed for air defense. This suggests that Russia has largely expended it ability to accurately attack targets outside of artillery range.
Although Putin has now twice threatened to use nuclear weapons, his failure to use them in response to the damage to the Kerch Bridge is some evidence that he’s not currently prepared to do so. Should he ultimately carry out this threat Russia would become a pariah among nations and he would likely lose the support of China and India, his two strongest allies. The fallout could also cause him to be deposed or worse. He also knows that using nukes could initiate a chain of events that could make our planet uninhabitable.
Putin’s rapidly diminishing ability to continue the war means that he would like to negotiate a settlement of the conflict while his army still holds portions of Ukraine. This is a stark reversal of his position at the beginning of the conflict when his forces were expanding their control within Ukraine. As might be expected, Volodymyr Zelensky is now not inclined to negotiate away any portion of Ukraine. That’s not only because he has gained confidence that his forces can retake those portions of his country currently occupied by Russia, but also because he fears that any territorial concessions he might make will only encourage Putin seek more at a later date.
Of course, Zelensky’s bravado is dependent upon his continuing to receive support from his NATO allies, most of whom are going to experience their own hardships emanating from the war as winter arrives. That, however, doesn’t seem to be a problem for the moment. At a recent conference of the G-7 countries there was strong support for providing Ukraine with additional military equipment including air defense systems. Such systems could prove pivotal should Putin starts loading his missile with unconventional warheads.
As Putin is well aware, a principal weakness of democracies is that they can be forced to alter their policies by applying pressure to their citizens. It is with this in mind that Putin has reduced shipments of natural gas to European nations, damaged the two Nord Stream pipelines and arranged for the OPEC+ countries to reduce their oil exports by 2 million barrels a day. These measures will make it a very cold winter for western Europeans as well as one plagued by high inflation and a likely economic recession. This may compel many of our European allies to reduce or defer all or a portion of their support for Ukraine.
The U.S. may therefore have to provide an even greater percentage of the military and humanitarian assistance required for the Ukrainians to continue their efforts to expel the Russian army. President Biden has already stated that he’s sending more tanks and anti-missile systems to Ukraine and is considering providing Ukraine with weapons with which it can attack Russia. While the U.S. is essentially energy self-sufficient, persistent inflation and the possibility of a recession as a result of the war could tip the November elections in favor of the Republicans some of whom have already voiced support for cutting further aid for Ukraine.
There are, of course, ample reasons why the U.S. should step up its aid to Ukraine. Over the past decade there has been a distinct movement away from democratic rule and toward authoritarian regimes. This movement is very much present even in the U.S. as well as in other countries such as Hungary, Brazil, Turkey, Phillipines. If the western democracies allow Russia to succeed in annexing additional portions of Ukraine, this movement could not only continue to spread but might do so at an accelerated pace. This would greatly jeopardize political and economic stability around the world. It is for that reason that the Biden administration is according a high priority to assisting Ukraine in its efforts to prevent further seizures of its territories. The only condition to its support is that the U.S. not be dragged into a direct conflict with Russia.
For Putin, winter can’t come soon enough. It was winter weather that saved Russia from Napoleon’s invasion; and Putin seems to be hoping that it will be his savior. Ukraine winters are also reported to be brutal making warfare difficult at best. Thus, winter could provide Putin with a desperately needed respite during which he can recruit and train new ground forces, manufacture additional weapons and resupply his existing forces. Conversely, Ukraine wants to press ahead with its counter-offensive and keep the Russian forces under pressure even through the winter months. With this in mind, President Zelensky is pressing Ukraine’s allies to continue to supply it with offensive weapons as well as systems that can intercept incoming missiles.
Even though Putin will eventually have to capitulate, the Ukrainians and their allies would like that to happen sooner rather than later. To bring the war to a faster conclusion, they need to find a way to make Putin pay a price for continuing to fight. The prospect of losing another 50,000 soldiers, however, is not likely to cause Putin to capitulate; and, unlike Putin, the Ukrainians are not at liberty to start lobbing missiles at Russian cities due to restrictions imposed upon them by their allies. They therefore must limit their efforts to driving Russia’s forces out of their country.
To increase the pressure on Putin to withdraw his forces, the Biden administration made an effort at the recent meeting of the U.N. to have Russia sanctioned for its war crimes. That effort only succeeded in revealing the ineffectiveness of the U.N. as Russia used its position on the Security Council to veto the U.S.’s resolution for affirmative action. Undeterred, the Biden administration is also undertaking further diplomatic efforts to have foreign countries curtail their economic relationships with Russia. Another possibility for applying pressure to Putin is to launch a media campaign designed to inform Russian citizens about the true state of the war and how it has been prosecuted by their government. The problem is that Putin has blocked numerous ways of getting information to the Russian people, most of whom deem it safer not to know such things.
Biden could also have the U.S. engage in acts of cyber warfare against Russia in retaliation for the recent hacking of U.S. airports; however, his administration still does not appear ready to take this or other actions that directly inflict damage on Russia. Therefore, for now the U.S.’s efforts to speed an end to the war will be through the imposition of expanded economic sanction and occasional seizures of yachts belonging to Russian oligarchs.
At this point the principal tools remaining in Putin’s weapons chest are a dwindling supply of tactical-range and anti-aircraft missiles. This means that the Ukrainians may be facing what will look like a fourth of July fireworks display with an increasing level of aerial attacks culminating in a dazzling crescendo of light, noise and destruction. Only when Putin has exhausted his remaining supply of missiles will he reluctantly capitulate.
This, however, will not bring an end to this sad saga as Putin will have to face a public backlash at home and international charges of war crimes. For their part, the Ukrainians will have to rebuild their country, a process that could cost hundreds of billions of dollars and take a decade or more to complete. An open question is whether the Ukrainians will be able to seize as war reparations the roughly $300 billion of Russian currency reserves now frozen in the U.S. and other western democracies.